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Environmental Law
The effect of the European Convention on Human Rights on UK 
environment law
by Jus tine Thornton and Stephen Tromans
The European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) does not refer to the 
environment in its list of rights and 
freedoms. The European Court of 
Human Rights, the body responsible for 
interpreting the convention is, however, 
creatively interpreting rights that are 
listed in it to counter environmental 
damage. The extent of its creativity is of 
particular relevance as the UK prepares 
to incorporate the convention into UK 
law.
RESPECT FOR HOME AND 
PRIVATE LIFE
The right to respect for private and 
family life (art. 8) features most 
prominently in the developing 
jurisprudence on environmental 
protection. This may be due in part to 
the fact that the first time that harm to 
the environment was found to be a 
breach of the convention it was found to 
be a breach of art. 8. In Lopez Ostra v 
Spain (joined applications 9278/81 and 
9415/8135D&R(1984)30)a treatment 
plant for liquid and solid tannery wastes, 
which was situated a few metres from the 
applicant's home in Lorca in Spain, 
released fumes, smells and contamination 
which caused health problems and 
nuisance to the local people.
The court was prepared to allow that 
environmental pollution could affect 
home and family lite:
'severe environmental pollution may affect 
individuals' well-being and prevent themjrom 
enjoying their homes in such a way as to affect 
their private andjamily life adversely, without, 
however, seriously endangering their health. '
The case of Lopez Ostra followed a line 
of earlier cases concerned with noise 
pollution. In the case of Rayner (Powell <%_ 
Rayner v United Kingdom 172 Eur Ct Hr 
(ser A) para. 41 (1990)), the applicant 
complained about noise from aircraft at 
London Heathrow Airport. The 
commission considered that noise 
nuisance can undoubtedly affect the 
physical well-being of a person and
thereby interfere with his private life. As 
well as physical well-being, the court has 
also shown itself prepared to protect a 
certain quality of life.
The scope of art. 8 has recently been 
extended to include failure by a 
government to release details of pollution 
risks. In Guerra v half (application 
116/1196/735/932) the court was 
prepared to find that a failure by the 
Italian authorities to provide the local 
population with information about the 
risk factor from a nearby chemical 
factory interfered with the right to a 
home life.
Article 8 is however limited in the 
extent to which it can protect the 
environment. The wording of its second 
paragraph allows a state to interfere with 
the right to a home life in the interests of
o
national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country. The 
court has, in practice, tended to grant 
states a considerable amount of leeway if 
an issue of national security or public 
safety arises.
Further, the only two cases where the 
applicant has succeeded in establishing a 
breach of the convention have, on their 
facts, been extreme (Lopez Ostra v Spain 
and Guerra v Italy).
RIGHT TO LIFE (ART. 2)
Protection of the environment is 
directly related to the right to life (art. 2), 
in that to survive people need 
uncontaminated food to eat, clean water 
to drink, healthy air to breathe and 
somewhere to shelter. So far, however, 
the court has adopted a restrictive 
interpretation of the right to life, 
confining it to the conditions under 
which a state inflicts capital punishment, 
rather than extending it to protecting the 
quality of life.
PEACEFUL ENJOYMENT OF 
POSSESSIONS
The commission has considered that 
every kind of negative effect caused by
environmental nuisances could indirectly 
amount to interference with the right to
o
peaceful possession of property (art. 1, 
protocol No. 1, 1952). In Rayner the 
court accepted that noise could affect the 
value of the property and therefore 
amount to a partial taking of the property
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
The right to a fair trial (art. 6) provides 
procedural rather than substantive 
protection. It does not require a 
particular result to be achieved, but it 
does regulate how the result is arrived at.
In Zander v Sweden (Ser A, No. 279B 
(1993)) the court found a breach of 
art. 6 because the applicant was unable to 
challenge the decision of a licensing 
authority to allow a company to dump 
waste on a tip without requiring the 
company concerned to take 
precautionary measures to avoid 
pollution of the applicant's drinking 
water.
Conversely, those who object to 
proposed action by the state to protect 
the environment also have the right to 
challenge such action before a tribunal. 
In Fredin v Sweden (ECHR, Ser A, No. 192 
(1991)) a landowner was unable to 
obtain judicial review of the authority's 
decision to prohibit him from extracting 
gravel. The court held that this amounted 
to a breach of art. 6.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Public access to information on the 
environment is recognised as a key aspect 
of environmental protection. Article 
10(1) includes the right to receive 
information. This has been interpreted as 
a negative obligation on the state not to
o o
impede an individual from obtaining 
access to information requested. It has 
not however extended to a positive 
obligation on the state to provide 
information. This was confirmed in the 
recent case of Guerra v Italy. 23
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It is not possible to conclude that any 
'environmental rights' have been 
established under the convention. The 
court and commission have accepted that 
the enjoyment of a certain quality of 
environment is part of enjoying the right 
to a family life and to peaceful enjoyment 
of possession. Yet only two applications 
have succeeded and these were, on their 
facts, extreme. The protection granted by 
the substantive rights is limited by the 
wide margin of discretion allowed to 
states as to how they choose to protect 
the environment. The emergingo o
jurisprudence shows a piecemeal and 
untidy picture. This is perhaps because 
protection of the environment is being 
squeezed into the ambit of other 
substantive rights. It may be, in this 
respect, that the procedural rights, such 
as a right to a tribunal and to access to 
information, offer a better opportunity 
for protecting the environment.
EFFECT OF THE ECHR ON 
UK ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The effects of incorporation of the 
convention on UK environmental law are 
difficult to predict. Much will depend on 
the ingenuity of lawyers' arguments in 
future cases and on judicial willingness to 
respond to what may well be an 
opportunity for a more creative approach 
to the law.
Effects on procedure
Access to justice and the procedural 
safeguards under UK law are as 
developed, if not more so, than the 
convention jurisprudence. The 
convention could however provide a 
useful backdrop for defendants, who are 
adopting increasingly sophisticated 
techniques in order to avoid a guilty plea, 
particularly as the number of 
prosecutions for environmental offences 
increases   as do the fines and adverse 
publicity associated with any prosecution.
In [996 the European Court of 
Human Rights held the use of evidence
o
obtained from Ernest Saunders (in R v 
Sounders, Case f75/78 [1979], ECR 
f!29; CMR 8558) under DTI 
investigatory powers in subsequent 
criminal proceedings against him was 
contrary to the requirement of fair 
procedure under art. 6 of the convention. 
The applicant in Hertfordshire County
Council ex pane Green Environmental 
Industries Ltd and John Moyneham (CA 
(Civil Division) 30 July f997) referred 
both to the Saunders case and art. 6. The 
case concerned the powers of the 
Environment Agency to request specified 
information under s. 71 of the 
Environmental Protection Act f990. The 
applicant claimed that this section could 
not be lawfully invoked for the purposes 
of conducting investigations into alleged 
criminal conduct. As the case was 
decided in the UK courts the court   
properly in the circumstances   decided 
the issue on EC case law. It did not 
however object to the reference to art. 6.
Expansion of litigants
Environmental issues are becoming an 
increasingly important part of 
management buy-outs, takeovers and 
corporate acquisitions and disposals. 
Although it is usual for analysis of the 
convention to focus on the rights given to 
individuals it is also the case that 
companies may make complaints under 
the convention. At present organisations 
and companies make comparatively few 
complaints. It is likely however that the 
number will increase once the 
convention is part of UK law.
Substantial rights have been given to 
companies under art. 1 of the first 
protocol and the right to peaceful 
possession of property. Industry may 
challenge decisions taken to protect the 
environment if these interfere with its 
possessions. Although not successful the 
case of Fredin indicates the potential 
application of the right. The applicant 
had obtained a permit to exhibit a gravel 
pit. An amendment to the law on nature 
conservation subsequently authorised the 
revocation of such permits. The applicant 
claimed this interfered with his right too
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.
Industry has also made use of art. 6 
and the right to a fair hearing. In Bentham 
v Netherlands (97 EUR CTHR (Ser A 
(1985)) the applicant applied for a 
licence to operate an installation for the 
delivery of liquid petroleum gas and 
motor vehicles. The licence was 
necessary to construct/operate 
installations that might be a source of 
danger or disturbance to surroundings. 
The licence was granted by local 
authorities but was then quashed by a 
national decree. The applicant alleged 
that the dispute had not been heard by an 
independent and impartial tribunal. The
court found art. 6 to be applicable. As 
already mentioned, Green Environmental 
Industries Ltd made use of art. 6 in their 
challenge to the right of the Environment 
Agency, to require it to provide specified 
information as part of an investigation 
into criminal behaviour.
Effects on the substantive law
It is possible to highlight several 
examples of where the rights to life and 
to a family and home life may in their 
present scope influence UK law. Of most 
significance to environmental law is the 
potential for expanding the scope of the 
nuisance action; the predominant 
method of environmental control at 
common law.
Under English law it is not possible to 
make a claim in private nuisance with 
absence of an exclusive interest in the 
land affected by the nuisance. A licensee 
or occupier has no right to sue. This 
restriction may well be a breach of the 
right to a family life under art. 8. A 
licensee or occupier ca'n, after all, still 
have a home life.
Under UK law, most of the activities 
which once constituted public nuisances 
at common law are now statutory 
nuisances, a regime which provides a 
faster and cheaper remedy. Light 
pollution is not covered under the 
current statutory nuisance provisions yet 
light can interfere with home life. In the 
circumstances a person might rely on the 
right to a home life in challenging any 
planning decision permitting, for 
example, the erection of floodlights that 
shine in neighbouring houses.
More interesting however is the 
potential for expansion of the rights to 
life and to a family life and the tentative 
willingness of the European Court and 
the commission to do so.
RECOGNITION
The court recognises for its part that in 
today's society the protection of the 
environment is an increasingly important 
consideration (European Court of Human 
Rights 1991).
In its judgments on art. 8 the 
European Court has accepted that it may 
be interpreted not only as requiring a 
state to abstain from interfering with the
O
individual's right to a home life, but also 
as including a positive obligation on the 
state to take positive measures to protect
these rights. This approach could require 
states to take positive measures to 
maintain or improve environmental 
quality to meet a standard compatible 
with respect for the right to private life.
The European Court has not yet gone 
so far as to require a state to undertake 
positive obligations. This may be due to 
the sensitivity of the court to the charge 
that it acts as a supranational body, which 
has made it wary of interfering in 
decisions made by states. The UK courts 
will not be under the same restraints and 
may adopt a more robust approach.
There are also indications of a 
willingness by the European Court to 
expand the scope to the right to life. In 
Association X v United Kingdom (application 
7154/75 14EurComnHRD&R, 31, 32 
[1979]), parents whose children had died 
or been severely injured as a result of 
vaccinations claimed that the British 
authorities had unjustifiably jeopardised 
the children's lives by not providing 
information on the risks of vaccination. 
The commission accepted that the state 
was obliged not only to refrain from 
taking life intentionally but also to take 
adequate steps to safeguard it. However,
as the state had not intended the injuries, 
and adequate measures had been taken, 
the complaint was declared to be ill- 
founded.
In Guerra v Italy Walsh J was of the view 
that art. 2 guarantees the protection of 
the bodily integrity of the applicants. 
Jambrek J saw the protection of health 
and physical integrity as being equally 
closely associated with the right to life as 
to the right to respect for private and 
family life. He was prepared to accept 
that the withholding of information 
about environmental risks could come 
within art. 2 and that the court's case law 
on art. 2 should start evolving in this 
respect.
Over time, an expansion of art. 2 may 
have the biggest effect on UK 
environmental law. The right to life could 
be invoked by workers claiming exposure 
to the risk of industrial accidents as a 
result of poor management systems or 
the use of chemicals whose toxicity is 
unknown. Similar principles will apply to 
risks from chronic pollution, as for 
example asthma caused by traffic, or 
exposure to asbestos dust or to 
pesticides.
CONCLUSION
There is certainly scope for the ECHR 
to affect the development of UK 
environmental law particularly with 
respect to creative uses of the right to life 
and the right to family and home life. The 
convention is also likely to perform the 
more nebulous task of keeping 
enforcement authorities on their toes in 
the light of the added weapon in the 
hands of plaintiffs.
Incorporation will not, however, 
resolve a number of underlying issues 
that make environmental litigation 
particularly difficult. These include 
valuing loss to the environment and 
linking the complex scientific 
explanations for pollution to legal 
concepts of causation. ^




Protection from discrimination: the European dimension
by Geoffrey Bindman
The government's intention in the 
Human Rights Act 1998 is to make the 
rights protected by the European Human 
Rights Convention (EHRC) enforceable 
in domestic law. This is to be achieved by 
requiring public authorities to act in 
conformity with those rights and by 
giving the courts the right to determine
o o o
whether or not they have done so. Judges 
must interpret both common law and 
statute law to give effect as far as possible 
to those rights. Only when a statute 
cannot be so interpreted will the courts 
be powerless to implement the 
convention. In that situation their role 
will be limited to making a declaration of 
incompatibility', which it will be for 
Parliament to correct. The domestic 
courts will not be bound by decisions of 
the European Court of Human Rights 
but they must take them into account.
The rights to be incorporated are only 
those set out in the convention. 
Surprisingly, these do not include the right 
not to suffer discrimination on racial or 
other arbitrary grounds. The convention 
provides in art. 14 merely as follows:
'The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms 
setjorth in this convention shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as 
sex, race, colour, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, birth orj
other status.'
Yutaka Arai, in an article in Amicus 
Curiae November 1998, at p. 6, explained 
how art. 14 has been interpreted by the 
European Court and Commission of 
Human Rights and demonstrated that 
they have given it a broad interpretation 
wherever possible, even to the extent of 
holding that a breach of art. 14 can occur
o
where no violation of a substantive right 
has been proved. Nevertheless the 
absence of a substantive right to be free 
of discrimination in the convention is a 
severe restriction on its effectiveness as a 
safeguard against unfair discrimination.
The limited protection against 
discrimination in the convention reflects 
a general lack of concern about
o
discrimination in Europe as a whole at 
the time when the convention was 
introduced in 1950. Notwithstanding the 
recent terrible experience of the 
Holocaust, politicians failed to recognise 
any role for the law in the protection of 
ethnic minorities. Such groups were 
often perceived in terms of nationality or 
citizenship, and there was a long-standing 
assumption that discrimination on those 
grounds was legitimate and a proper 
exercise of national sovereignty. 25
